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Abstract 
Economic policies that boost the return to mixed agroforesty, thereby creating financial 
incentives for land managers to favor these systems over less environmentally friendly land uses, could, 
in theory, have ancillary environmental benefits. This paper analyses primary and secondary data to 
determine whether a voluntary price support program for Mexican coffee—mostly grown in shaded 
systems that supply important ecosystem services—has had such “win-win” benefits by stemming 
rampant land-use change in the coffee sector. We find that although the program attracted the types of 
growers associated with land-use change, it attracted only a relatively small number of them, did not 
target growing areas hardest hit by conversion to other land uses, and provided subsidies that were 
probably too small to affect land-use decisions. These results raise serious questions about the ability of a 
mixed agroforestry price support program with a modest price floor to have a significant conservation 
impact. 
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Agroforestry Price Supports as a Conservation Tool: 
Mexican Shade Coffee 
Beatriz Ávalos-Sartorio and Allen Blackman∗ 
1. Introduction 
Mixed agroforestry systems, in which crops such as coffee, cocoa, and bananas are 
planted side by side with woody perennials, can provide important ecosystem services. They can 
harbor biodiversity, sequester carbon, prevent soil erosion, and aid in flood control and aquifer 
recharge (Daily et al. 2003; Castro et al. 2003; Vandermeer and Perfecto 1997). In addition, they 
can provide biological corridors between patches of primary forests and help preserve forests by 
diverting extractive activities, such as hunting and foraging (Gajaseni et al. 1996; Saunders and 
Hobbs 1991). Hence, policies and programs that boost the return to mixed agroforesty, thereby 
creating financial incentives for land managers to retain these systems instead of switching to 
less environmentally friendly land uses, could, in theory, have ancillary environmental benefits.1 
The literature on this link is thin, however. We know little about whether and to what extent 
economic policies aimed at supporting mixed agroforestry effectively serve double duty as 
conservation tools, and how they might be designed or modified to enhance such synergies.  
To help fill that gap, this paper presents a case study of a historical episode in which a 
policy aimed at raising returns to a mixed agroforesty system had the potential to generate “win-
win” environmental benefits. We examine Mexico’s Coffee Stabilization Fund (Fondo de 
Estabilizción del Café, FEC), a voluntary program that guarantees participating growers a set 
price for their crop. The FEC was established in the 2001–2002 harvest season in response to the 
so-called coffee crisis—the precipitous decline in world coffee prices during the 1980s and 
1990s that culminated in a 100-year low during the 2000–2001 season. In addition to creating 
                                                 
∗  Ávalos-Sartorio is director of academic development at the Polytechnic University of Morelos. Blackman 
(corresponding author) is a senior fellow at Resources for the Future; blackman@rff.org. This research was partially 
funded by Dr. Ávalos-Sartorio’s Gilbert White Fellowship at Resources for the Future. We are grateful to 
discussants and participants at meetings of the Southern Economic Association and the Latin American and 
Caribbean Environmental Economic Association for valuable comments and suggestions. 
1 Mixed agroforesty systems typically provide lower levels of ecosystem services than native forest. Therefore, 
policies and programs that create incentives for land managers to convert native forest to mixed agroforestry can 
entail environmental costs (Rappole et al. 2002). Our focus is on policies that create incentives for the retention of 
existing systems.  Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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economic hardship, the crisis spurred significant conversion of coffee farms to cleared land uses, 
including row crops and pasture. Because the Mexican coffee sector is dominated by densely 
shaded systems located in particularly biodiverse areas, the end result was significant loss of tree 
cover along with critical ecosystem services (Moguel and Toledo 1999; Batz et al. 2005; 
Blackman et al. 2005).  
In principle, the FEC had the potential to mitigate those environmental damages by 
creating financial incentives for growers to continue to cultivate shade coffee instead switching 
to other land uses or abandoning their farms and leaving them vulnerable to encroachment. 
However, the program could have stemmed tree cover loss only if it changed the behavior of 
significant number of growers who otherwise would have cleared the tree cover or abandoned 
their farms. Accordingly, we use detailed census data along with original survey data on coffee 
growers to address four sets of questions about the FEC:  
 
i.  What was the scope of the program? Did it attract a significant percentage of coffee 
growers and of the total coffee acreage? 
ii.  What type of growers participated? Did the program attract the growers who were 
responsible for tree cover loss?  
iii.  Where were participating growers located? Were their farms in areas where tree cover 
loss was most severe?  
iv.  Were the program’s subsidies large enough to affect growers’ land-use decisions?  
 
To make the analysis manageable, we focus on a limited geographic area and time frame: 
the Coast and Southern Sierra (Costa y Sierra Sur) region of the state of Oaxaca in the 2002–
2003 harvest season, the second year of FEC program operation.  
We find that although the FEC attracted the types of growers associated with tree cover 
loss, it attracted only a relatively small number of them, did not target growing areas hardest hit 
by tree cover loss, and provided subsidies that were probably too small to affect land-use 
decisions. Taken together, these results suggest that the FEC, by itself, probably did little to stem 
tree cover loss in Mexico’s Coast and Southern Sierra coffee growing area.  Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides 
background on the Mexican coffee sector, the FEC, and our study area. The third section briefly 
discusses our data. The fourth section presents an analysis of the four questions listed above. The 
fifth section presents a summary and conclusion.  
2. Background 
In Mexico, coffee production represents an important source of income for some 481,000 
households that cultivate 665,000 hectares of coffee and hire at least one million laborers 
annually (CMC 2004a). The lion’s share of coffee farms are smaller than 3 hectares each and are 
concentrated in some of the country’s poorest regions. 
Almost 90 percent of Mexican coffee is cultivated in mixed systems in which coffee 
bushes are planted alongside trees, and almost 40 percent—including virtually all the coffee in 
our study area—is cultivated in “rustic” and “traditional” systems characterized by relatively 
dense and diverse tree cover that generates ecosystem services on par with native forest. The 
biodiversity benefits of Mexican shade coffee are particularly notable. All 14 of Mexico’s main 
coffee-growing regions have been designated biodiversity “hotspots” by the country’s national 
commission on biodiversity (Moguel and Toledo 1999; Perfecto et al. 1996).  
The coffee crisis had a dramatic effect on Mexico’s coffee sector. Between 1990 and 
2004, coffee production in Mexico fell 21 percent, and exports fell 56 percent (ICO 2005). 
During the same period, coffee export revenue fell 80 percent, from US$450 million to US$250 
million (SourceMex 2004). By the end of the 1990s, prices received by many Mexican growers 
had dropped to levels below average production costs, severely affecting the economy in coffee-
growing areas. 
The Mexican federal government responded to the coffee crisis by implementing a series 
of programs targeting the coffee sector beginning in the 2001–2002 coffee season. The flagship 
initiative was the FEC, a US$80 million permanent fund that provides price supports to coffee 
growers when international prices drop below an established floor of US$85 per hundredweight Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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(cwt) of green coffee (CMC 2001).2,3 Operated by the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture, the FEC 
provides a maximum subsidy of US$20 per cwt of Arabica coffee for up to 20 cwt per 
participating producer.4 To participate, coffee producers must be registered in the National 
Coffee Census (Padrón Nacional Cafetalero), must sell their coffee to registered buyers, and 
must pick up their subsidy checks in person at the designated local government office. FEC rules 
establish a mechanism for maintaining the US$80 million fund: participating producers commit 
to accepting a discounted price when the international price of coffee exceeds US$85, and the 
amount of the discount is used to replenish the FEC fund.5 
This case study focuses on the Coast and Southern Sierra region in the state of Oaxaca, 
which produces about one-fifth of Mexico’s coffee. Three-quarters of the region’s coffee acreage 
is managed by poor, small-scale growers using densely shaded systems (Nestel 1995). According 
to the most recent census, in this region, 33,000 producers grow coffee on 87,000 hectares 
(ASERCA 2004). We provide more details about these coffee growers in Section 4.2, below. 
According to local stakeholders, most tree cover loss in the Coast and Southern Sierra 
coffee region resulted from logging and shifting agriculture. Rural households often cleared 
small plots to sell the timber and grow subsistence crops. However, the poor soils on these 
plots—which are typically steeply sloped—were quickly eroded by rainfall. As a result, shifting 
farmers typically moved on to new plots within a few years (Ávalos-Sartorio 2005). Under 
                                                 
2 Coffee in Mexico is harvested from October to March. In its first year, FEC was operated by the Mexican Coffee 
Council (Consejo Mexicano del Café, CMC). Other government programs that support the coffee sector are (i) the 
Market Promotion Program (Programa de Promoción de Mercado), aimed at improving coffee marketing; (ii) the 
Program of Withholding Inferior Quality Coffee (Programa de Retiro de Café de Calidades Inferiores), which 
exhorts producers not to sell poor-quality coffee; (iii) the Program to Promote Coffee Production (Programa de 
Impulso a la Producción de Café), which provides subsidies to producers to carry out actions that increase per 
hectare yields; and (iv) the Plan of Producer Support to Promote Crop Production (Esquema de Apoyo a la 
Producción y para Fomentar la Realización de la Cosecha), in which registered producers received a one-time 
payment of US$95 per hectare to support harvesting costs in 2000–2001. 
3 The standard measure of coffee, a cwt, is equivalent to 100 pounds or 46 kilograms and is often referred to as one 
quintal.  
4 The price compensation for Robusta coffee, a coffee species rarely grown in Mexico, is up to US$10 per cwt for 
up to 15 cwt per participating producer. 
5 The discount varies from US$3 per cwt when the international price is between US$85 and US$89.5 per cwt, to 
US$20 when the international price is US$140 or more. To be continuously eligible to participate, producers must 
demonstrate that they have participated in the FEC’s replenishment in years when international prices have exceeded 
the price ceiling. Starting in 2005-2006, discounts are triggered only when the international price is greater than 
US$100 (AMECAFE 2008). Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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Mexican law, all persons wishing to clear forested land must obtain a federal permit and in some 
cases a local permit, regardless of the scale of the clearing (NACEC 2003). However, persons 
clearing small plots for agriculture frequently ignored these requirements. Enforcement of 
forestry laws mainly depends on citizen denunciations of violators and is consequently 
haphazard, especially in remote areas.  
3. Data 
We used four complementary data bases to address the four sets of questions listed in 
Section 1. First, a 2001–2004 census of approximately 33,000 coffee growers in the Coast and 
Southern Sierra region compiled by the Agricultural Marketing Services agency (Apoyos y 
Servicios a la Comercialización Agropecuaria, ASERCA), a Mexican governmental institution. 
The ASERCA census includes data on farm size, land tenure, and location. Second, we use 1995 
town-level data on the socioeconomic characteristics of the Coast and Southern Sierra region 
compiled by the National Population Council (Consejo Nacional de Población, CONAPO), 
another Mexican government agency. The CONAPO data include socioeconomic indicators and 
distance to the town center from paved roads for more than 400 towns in this region. Third, we 
use a 2004 list of the study area’s coffee growers who participated in the FEC program in the 
2002–2003 harvest season. The list was compiled by the Mexican Coffee Council (Consejo 
Mexicano del Café, CMC). Finally, we use coffee production data based on January 2005 
interviews with coffee producers in our study area (Ávalos-Sartorio 2005) and on secondary data 
provided by local NGOs, grower organizations, and other stakeholders.  
4. Analysis 
4.1. Scope of FEC participation 
The ASERCA census lists 33,156 coffee growers in our study region, collectively 
cultivating 86,956 hectares. Of these growers, 9,020 (27 percent) participated in the FEC in the 
2002–2003 harvest season. These participants cultivated 24 percent of the total land in coffee. 
Thus, the FEC’s purview in our study area was limited: only approximately a quarter of all 
growers representing slightly more than a quarter of the land planted in coffee participated in the 
program. This finding suggests that to be effective as a conservation tool, the FEC would have to 
have been particularly effective in attracting growers responsible for deforestation.  
 Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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4.2. What type of growers participated in the FEC?  
We use multiple regression analysis to identify the characteristics of the growers who 
participated in the FEC. To underpin the econometric analysis, Appendix 1 presents a simple 
analytical model of a coffee grower’s decision to participate. The model demonstrates that a 
grower’s decision depends on two general factors: the profits she obtains from coffee absent the 
FEC program, and the transaction costs she pays to participate (e.g., the costs of obtaining 
information about the program, filling out the necessary paperwork, selling to registered buyers, 
and picking up subsidies in person). Both preprogram profits and participation transaction costs 
depend on the characteristics of the coffee farm and of the grower. For example, all other things 
equal, growers at high altitudes produce higher-quality coffee and therefore earn higher profits 
but pay higher transaction costs because they are farther from FEC offices. The analytical model 
can be used to demonstrate that as one would expect, growers who earn relatively low 
preprogram profits and those who pay lower transaction costs are more likely to participate in the 
program. 
4.2.1. Variables 
Table 1 lists the farm and grower characteristic variables used in the econometric analysis 
of program participation (as well as in a second analysis discussed in Section 4.3). The variables 
are FARM_SIZE, the size of the farm measured in hectares; ALTITUDE, the altitude of the farm 
measured in meters above sea level (msl); PRIVATE, a dichotomous dummy variable indicating 
the farm is privately owned (versus communally owned by a communidad agraria or an ejido); 
P_INDIGENOUS, the percentage of the population aged five and over in the town where the 
farm is located who speak an indigenous language instead of Spanish; P_WOMEN, the 
percentage of the population in the town where the farm is located who are female; and 
KM_TO_ROAD, the distance from the nearest town center to the nearest paved road.  Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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Table 1. Variables used in econometric analyses 
Variable Explanation  Units  Source Level  Mean 
All 
(n = 23,284) 
Mean 
Participants 




Dependent              
 PARTICIPATE  Grower participated in FEC 
’02–’03 season 
0/1 CMC  (2004) farm  0.25  1  0 
Independent              
 FARM_SIZE  Size farm  ha  ASERCA (2004) farm  2.86  2.51  2.97 
 ALTITUDE  Altitude farm  m.s.l.  ASERCA (2004) farm  1,033.15 1,021.09 1,037.10 
 PRIVATE  Tenure farm is private  0/1 ASERCA  (2004) farm  0.11  0.09  0.12 
 P_INDIGENOUS   % town population indigenous % CONAPO  (1998) town  16.29  15.84  16.44 
 P_WOMEN  % town population female %  CONAPO  (1998) town  50.19  50.07  50.22 
 KM_TO_ROAD   Distance twn. ctr. to paved rd.  km.  CONAPO (1998) town  14.38  14.40  14.37 
 P_CLEAR*  % forest in town cleared ’93–
’02 
% Blackman  et  al. 
(2005) 
town 4.39*  4.54*  4.33* 
*Number of observations for P_CLEAR: all farms n = 8193; participants n = 2155; nonparticipants = 6038. 
 
The data set used to analyze participation in the FEC was created by merging three of the 
data sets discussed in Section 3 (ASERCA 2004; CONAPO 1998; CMC 2004b). Of the 33,156 
coffee growers in our study area listed in the ASERCA census, 23,284 (70 percent) survived this 
merge. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample (n = 23,284), as well as for 
participants (n = 5,741) and nonparticipants (n = 17,543). The statistics show that the typical 
coffee grower in our study area was small-scale, was located at relatively high altitude and more 
than 10 km from a paved road, was cultivating communally owned land, and was not indigenous. 
As for our expectations about the effect of grower and farm characteristics on the 
probability of FEC participation, the variables fall into two categories: those that have 
unidirectional effects on this probability, and those that have countervailing effects. The first 
category only includes one variable: ALTITUDE. We expect ALTITUDE to be negatively 
correlated with the probability of participation. Growers at higher altitudes typically earn a 
relatively high return on their coffee because they produce better-quality beans that fetch better 
prices. Also, growers located at higher altitudes pay higher transaction costs for participating in 
the FEC because they have to travel longer distances to FEC offices and banks in the cities of 
Pochutla and Puerto Escondido, both of which are located on the coastal plain.  
 We expect the remaining farm characteristic variables—FARM_SIZE, PRIVATE, 
P_INDIGENOUS, P_WOMEN, and KM_TO_ROAD—to have countervailing effects on the 
probability of participation. They have one effect through returns to coffee, and an opposite Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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effect through transaction costs; which effect dominates is an empirical issue. As for 
P_INDIGENOUS, in Mexico, heavily indigenous populations do not have equal access to public 
sector goods and services, including education, technical extension, agricultural marketing, 
credit, and infrastructure (Patrinos 2000). As a result, such populations likely pay higher prices 
for coffee inputs and receive lower prices for their beans. Hence indigenous growers earn 
relatively low returns on coffee and have relatively strong incentives to participate in the FEC. 
But on the other hand, indigenous growers also likely incur higher-than-average transaction costs 
to participate in the program.  
PRIVATE also has countervailing effects on the probability of participation. Private 
growers likely earn lower returns on coffee than growers affiliated with a communally owned 
and operated communidad or ejido because they do not have the bargaining power to negotiate 
favorable prices for inputs and outputs. But such growers also pay higher transaction costs of 
participating in the FEC program because they cannot rely on cooperative institutions to gather 
relevant information and assist with paperwork and transportation. 
As for P_WOMEN, a relatively high percentage of women in the local population reflects 
out-migration of men seeking nonfarm work, and is a proxy for the number of coffee farms 
headed by women. Because of the prevailing culture of the region, men are often able to 
negotiate better input and output prices than are women (Ávalos-Sartorio 2005). Thus, one 
would expect women-headed farms to earn relatively low returns on coffee and have relatively 
strong incentives to participate in the FEC program. But for the same cultural reasons, women 
probably also incur higher transaction costs of participating.  
 FARM_SIZE too is likely to have countervailing effects on the probability of 
participation. Large growers typically earn higher profits on coffee than small growers because 
transportation, processing, and marketing of coffee inputs and outputs exhibit economies of 
scale.6 But the transaction costs that large growers pay to participate in the FEC are probably 
lower than those of small growers. Unlike large growers who typically sell to registered buyers 
as required under FEC rules, small growers tend to sell their coffee to informal middlemen who 
provide them with working capital (Ávalos-Sartorio 2005). Therefore, small growers would need 
to identify and switch to new buyers to participate. Just as important, small growers are not able 
                                                 
6 Also, unlike large growers, small growers sometimes sell their coffee at a relatively early stage of processing—as 
natural (dried whole cherries) or as pergamino (before the paper-like husk covering the bean has been removed)—
instead of as green coffee. Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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to spread the fixed transaction costs of participating over as many units of output as large 
growers.  
Finally, we also expect KM_TO_ROAD to have countervailing effects on the probability 
of participation in the FEC program. Growers located far from paved roads obtain lower returns, 
all other things equal, because of transportation costs. Such growers have relatively strong 
incentives to join the FEC program but would also pay higher transaction costs to participate.  
4.2.2. Regression results 
Table 2 (Model 1) presents the results of a probit regression aimed at explaining 
participation in the FEC. All the variables are significant except for KM_TO_ROAD. We had 
unequivocal expectations about the sign of one variables—ALTITUDE and it has the expected 
negative sign: farms at higher altitudes were less likely to participate in the FEC.  
Table 2. Probit regression results  
(dependent variable = PARTICIPATE) 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2 















































        
No. obs.  23284    8534   
Pseudo R
2  0.0034  0.0000  
LL -12961.207  -4959.1561    
*** significant at 1% level 
** significant at 5% level 
* significant at 10% level 
§dichotomous dummy variable 
 
Recall that the remaining significant variables—FARM_SIZE, PRIVATE, 
P_INDIGENOUS, and P_WOMEN—have countervailing effects on the probability of Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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participation, and as a result, we did not have strong expectations about their signs. FARM_SIZE 
is negative: large farms were less likely to participate than small ones. Hence, for FARM_SIZE, 
the returns effect dominates the transaction costs effect: the disincentive for large farms to 
participate because they earned relatively high returns outweighed the incentive due to paying 
relatively low transaction costs.    
For PRIVATE, P_INDIGENOUS, and P_WOMEN the opposite is true. All are negative: 
growers with privately held land and those that were indigenous and female (to be exact, growers 
in towns that were disproportionately indigenous and female) were less likely to participate. 
Hence for PRIVATE, P_INDIGENOUS, and P_WOMEN, the transaction cost effect dominates 
the returns effect; that is, for growers with privately held land and those that were indigenous and 
female, the disincentive to participate due to relatively high transaction costs outweighs the 
positive incentive due to relatively low returns.  
To sum up, we find that farms that were small, located at low altitudes, with communal 
land tenure, and not run by indigenous growers or women were more likely to participate in the 
FEC program. These results suggest that variations across farms in both preprogram profitability 
and in transaction costs help explain participation.  
What are the implications for deforestation? Previous econometric research (Blackman et 
al. 2005, 2008) as well as interview evidence (Ávalos-Sartorio 2005) suggests that in our study 
area, the coffee farms responsible for deforestation were small, located at low altitudes, and had 
communal land tenure; that is, for the most part, they had same characteristics as the farms that 
participated in the FEC program. This is not surprising, since farms earning low returns were 
more likely to clear tree cover and were also more likely to participate. Hence, the program does 
appear to have targeted, with reasonable accuracy, the growers most likely to clear tree cover. 
4.3. Where were participating growers located?  
The results presented in the previous section suggest that the FEC program attracted the 
type of growers responsible for deforestation. Presumably, then, these growers were located in 
areas experiencing the most severe tree cover loss. To test this hypothesis, we analyze spatially 
explicit town-level data on rates of deforestation. These data were generated by comparing land 
cover maps derived from LANDSAT satellite images for 1993 and 2001 that cover a portion of 
the same territory as our study area (for a detailed description of the data and the methodology 
used to derive them, see Blackman et al. 2005). These data show that 27,000 hectares of land that 
were forested in 1993 had been cleared by 2001. However, 19,000 hectares of land that were Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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cleared in 1993 had been reforested by 2001. These figures imply a net loss of 8,000 hectares of 
forest cover, representing approximately 3 percent of the area of the land cover maps.7  
Because we do not know the exact location (latitude and longitude) of the coffee farms in 
our data set—we only know the towns in which they are located—we are not able to analyze the 
correlation between participation in the FEC program and rates of deforestation at the farm level. 
Instead, we use town-level data—specifically, data on the percentage of forest cover lost for each 
of 479 towns in our land cover maps. Next we create a farm-level variable, P_CLEAR, that 
associates each farm with the percentage of forest cover lost in the town where it is located. 
Because the land cover maps depict only a portion of our study area, the number of farms in this 
analysis is roughly a third of that for the econometric analysis of participation. Finally, we use a 
simple probit regression to determine whether P_CLEAR is correlated with the probability of 
participation in the FEC program.8  
Table 2 (Model 2) presents the probit regression results. P_CLEAR is not significant. 
Hence, FEC program participation is not any more likely in towns with high historical 
deforestation rates than in towns with low rates. That is, our data suggest that the FEC does not 
appear to geographically target the “right” areas from a forest conservation perspective.  
4.4. Were FEC subsidies large enough to affect land-use decisions? 
The 2002–2003 FEC price floor (US$85, or 756 pesos per cwt) was well below average 
coffee prices during the 1980s and 1990s (Figure 1). This fact begs the question of whether the 
FEC subsidies were sufficiently large to affect growers’ land-use decisions. To help answer this 
question, we constructed a simple linear model of a representative coffee farm household and 
used it to develop back-of-the-envelope estimates of the percentage of the coffee farm’s 
subsistence needs that were met with income from coffee production, assuming alternatively that 
the farm did, and did not, participate in the FEC. We developed a range of such estimates for 
farms of various sizes.  
                                                 
7 Equivalently, the area experienced a 0.4% average annual deforestation rate between 1993 and 2001. 
8 Ideally, we could develop a simultaneous equation econometric model that explains both participation in the FEC 
program and deforestation. Both phenomena are driven by the same factors (ALTITUDE, FARM_SIZE, etc.) that 
determine the coffee growers’ profits. Unfortunately, however, we do not have the requisite data. Specifically, our 
deforestation data are at the town level, not the farm level, and they predate our participation data by several years. 
Hence, the goal of our analysis is modest. We simply want to determine whether participation is more likely in areas 
where past deforestation has been most intense. Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
 
12 
Figure 1. Average pergamino coffee prices per hundredweight (cwt), 























2002-2003 price floor = 756 
pesos (US $85) per cwt
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on “C” contract quotes from the New York Board of Trade 
(http://www.nybot.com/), exchange rate data from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (http://www.cme.com), 
inflation data from the Banco de México (www.banxico.org.mx/), and data on local transportation costs 
gathered by the authors. 
We did not explicitly model the link between deforestation and the percentage of a coffee 
farm’s subsistence needs that were met with coffee profits. However, as discussed in Section 2, 
previous research as well as plentiful anecdotal evidence suggests that most of the deforestation 
in our study area occurs when coffee farms—particularly small ones—are not able to meet their 
subsistence needs and turn to selling timber and shifting subsistence agriculture to help fill the 
gap (Blackman et al. 2005).9  
The simulation model is parameterized with data culled from official statistics as well as 
interviews with local stakeholders (Ávalos-Sartorio 2005). To the extent possible, we assume 
                                                 
9 Large growers, by contrast, are less frequently associated with deforestation. Stakeholder interviews suggest that 
their response to falling returns has most often been to completely abandon their farms, not to clear them for 
alternative land uses. Moreover, large growers have evidently been successful at preventing encroachment on 
abandoned farms by loggers, ranchers, and conventional farmers, presumably because they have the requisite 
political power (Ávalos-Sartorio 2005). Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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average prices, yields, and costs for the 2002–2003 growing season. To ensure that our modeling 
assumptions are not driving our ultimate conclusion that FEC subsidies did not significantly 
improve most growers’ ability to meet their subsistence needs, we make relatively conservative 
assumptions about parameter values; that is, the assumptions bias upward our estimate of the 
percentage change in subsistence needs attributable to the FEC. 
The equations and parameters for the simulation model are detailed in Appendix 2. We 
summarize the major assumptions here. We assume that growers obtain an average yield of 4.3 
cwt of pergamino coffee per hectare; this is the region’s average yield according to a 1991 coffee 
grower census (the most recent yield data available), which is likely a significant overestimate 
for the 2002–2003 harvest season.10 We assume that growers who did not participate in the FEC 
program received the 2002–2003 average market price of 430 pesos per cwt of pergamino and 
that growers who did participate received 756 pesos per cwt, equivalent to the price floor of 
US$85 dollars per cwt. As for costs, we assume that the grower carried out the bare minimum 
level of maintenance activities: two weedings and harvesting. Furthermore, we assume that these 
activities could be carried out at zero opportunity cost using family labor only, as long as the 
farm was no larger than 5 hectares. Finally, we make the conservative assumption that coffee 
households’ minimum subsistence needs are 28,800 pesos per year (approximately US$3,000), 
the annual wage of an unskilled male adult who works in the local construction sector.  
Figure 2 shows the model’s estimated coffee profits as a share of household subsistence 
needs by farm size and FEC participation. Several features of the figure are notable. First, the 
share of annual subsistence needs met by coffee production is increasing in farm size up to 5 
hectares because as farm size increases, revenues increase proportionately while labor costs do 
not change. After 5 hectares, however, the share of subsistence needs met by coffee declines 
because the farm must hire external labor. Second, for any given farm size, the share of annual 
subsistence needs met by coffee is higher if the farm participates in the FEC program because in 
this case, it receives higher per hectare revenues.  
 
                                                 
10 The 1991 average yield is likely well above the 2002–2003 average. In the low-price years preceding 
the 2002–2003 harvest season, growers cut back on “discretionary” weeding and crop maintenance, which has a 
lasting adverse effect on yield. Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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Figure 2. Coffee profits as share of household subsistence needs, 
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Ávalos-Sartorio (2005) 
Hence, in our model, a farm of 5 hectares meets the greatest percentage of its subsistence 
needs. The model suggests that in the 2002–2003 crop season, such a farm would meet 30 
percent of its subsistence needs if it did not participate in the FEC program, and 55 percent of its 
subsistence needs if it did participate. However, the median farm size in our study area was just 
1.5 hectares. Such a farm would meet just 10 percent of its subsistence needs if it did not 
participate in the FEC program, and 20 percent of its subsistence needs if it did participate. Note 
that the model suggests that the FEC program enabled otherwise unprofitable large farms to earn 
profits from coffee production. Farms larger than 11 hectares lose money from coffee production 
if they do not participate, but with the program, farms up to 115 hectares generate profits.  Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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Hence, our back-of-the envelope calculations suggest that the FEC program did not 
significantly improve the ability of small growers to meet their subsistence needs. This was due 
to two factors. First, the program paid a per hectare subsidy, not a per household subsidy, which 
implied that small farms received less financial assistance than large ones. Second, the FEC 
program established a per hectare price floor that was simply too low to enable the average 
household to meet subsistence needs. 
5. Conclusion 
We have used both primary and secondary data to evaluate the potential for Mexico’s 
FEC to stem rapid deforestation in the Coast and Southern Sierra region, one of the country’s 
main shade-coffee areas in the early 2000s. We found that the program attracted the types of 
coffee farms that tended to earn low returns and that were associated with deforestation: those 
that were relatively small, located at low altitudes, and those with communal land tenure. 
However, we found that the program’s reach was limited. In 2002–2003, only approximately a 
quarter of all growers in our study area representing approximately a quarter of the land planted 
in coffee participated in the program. Moreover, the FEC did not target the “right” locations: 
program participation was not any more likely in towns with high historical deforestation rates 
than in towns with low rates. Finally, we estimated that participation in the FEC did not 
significantly improve the ability of the average small coffee farm-household in our study area to 
meet its subsistence needs. Taken together, these results suggest that the FEC, by itself, probably 
did little to stem tree cover loss in Mexico’s Coast and Southern Sierra coffee-growing area. 
How could the FEC and programs like it be modified to make them more effective as 
conservation tools? One obvious option would be to raise the price floor to attract more growers 
responsible for land-use change and provide them with sufficiently strong financial incentives to 
retain their land in shade coffee. A second option would be to complement price support 
programs with other initiatives, including those that provide lump-sum payments to help cover 
harvesting costs, technical assistance for improved quality and marketing, and payments for 
environmental services provided by shade-coffee. However, large increases in government 
expenditure in the coffee sector may not be politically or economically feasible.  
A third option would be to use existing fiscal resources devoted to the program more 
strategically. The aim would be to reduce the transaction costs of program participation for 
precisely the types of growers responsible for deforestation in geographic areas where 
deforestation risk is highest—that is, to target program outreach at a subpopulation of growers. 
This could be accomplished by, for example, funding more branch offices in certain areas, Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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developing subsidy payment mechanisms that do not require participants to travel to distant 
program offices, and reducing red tape. Such strategies could have not only helped the program 
stem tree cover loss but also furthered its stated objective of softening the economic impact of 
the coffee crisis, since in our study region, the small-scale, disadvantaged growers responsible 
for deforestation were also those most affected economically by the price shocks.  
Although our analysis suggests that such targeting would be likely to enhance the 
conservation benefits of price support programs like the FEC, it does not guarantee that the effect 
will be significant. Unfortunately, overall, our analysis raises serious questions about the ability 
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Appendix 1. Analytical model of coffee grower’s FEC participation decision 
This appendix presents a simple analytical model of a coffee grower’s decision to 
participate in the FEC. We assume that growers maximize the following profit function each 
harvest season:  
()() ()( ) ( ) o , r i Z T Z q C Z q Z P max i i i i i
) i , i q (
= − − = Π  (1.1) 
where 
  Π ≡ expected profit  
 i  ≡ an index of participation (r) or nonparticipation (o) 
 P  ≡ price of coffee 
 Z  ≡ a vector of farm characteristics  
 q  ≡ coffee quantity 
 C  ≡ a production cost function 
 T  ≡ transaction costs associated with participation in the FEC program 
 
Thus, growers maximize profit by choosing an output quantity and by deciding whether 
to participate in the FEC. Each component of the profit function depends on farm characteristics, 
Z, and some of these components depend on whether the grower participates in the FEC. Coffee 
price, P, depends on farm characteristics because, for example, farms at higher altitudes are able 
to grow higher-quality coffee, which fetches a higher price than bulk coffee grown at low 
altitudes. In years when average coffee prices are below the FEC price floor, price can depend on 
whether the grower participates in the program. Output, q(·), depends on farm characteristics 
because, for example, farms at higher altitudes typically have higher coffee yields per hectare. 
Output also depends on participation in the FEC because growers who participate and obtain 
price subsidies may choose to harvest more of their crop than they otherwise would. Production 
costs, C(·), depend on farm characteristics because, for example, large farms are able to negotiate 
better input prices with suppliers. Finally, growers who participate in the FEC pay transaction 
costs to do so. These include costs of obtaining information about the program, filling out the 
necessary paperwork, selling to registered buyers, and picking up subsidies in person. 
Transaction costs depend on farm characteristics because, for example, larger farms are able to Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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spread these fixed costs over more output, and because non-Spanish-speaking indigenous 
growers incur greater informational and administrative costs.  
Growers decide whether to participate in the FEC by comparing the maximum profit that 
can be obtained from participating, Π*r(Z), with the maximum profit that can be obtained by not 
participating, Π*o(Z). Equivalently, the grower calculates  
 
I* = Π*r(Z) - Π*o(Z)   (1.2) 
 
and will participate as long as I* > 0. Using this simple framework, it is easy to see that 
growers who obtain relatively low profits absent the FEC program, Π*o(Z), are more likely to 
participate in the program. For example, absent the program, growers at low altitudes obtain 
inferior prices for their coffee and are therefore more likely to participate. Also, growers who 
pay lower transaction costs to participate in the program are more likely to do so. Our 
econometric model is a reduced form of equation 1:  
 
Ij* = f(Zj)   (1.3) 
 
where j indexes individual growers. Although I* is latent and unobserved, we do observe 
an indicator variable, Ij, which takes the value of one if the grower participates and zero 
otherwise; that is, we observe, 
Ij = 1 if Ij* > 0  
Ij = 0 if Ij* ≤ 0. 
 
Using Ij as our dependent variable, we estimate equation 2 as a simple probit. Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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Appendix 2. Simulation model of a representative coffee farm 
The following equations constitute a simple linear model of a representative coffee farm 
in the Coast and Southern Sierra region of Oaxaca, Mexico, that we use to generate a back-of-
the-envelope estimate of the percentage of the farm household’s subsistence needs met by 
income from coffee production. Uppercase letters represent linear functions of parameters, and 
lowercase italic letters represent parameters.  
Π = PYf – Cf (2.1) 
Total profits from coffee, Π, are equal to total revenues minus total costs. Total revenues, 
in turn, are equal to P, the price per hundredweight (cwt) of pergamino coffee, times Y, the yield 
per hectare in cwt pergamino coffee, times f, the farm size in hectares. Total costs are equal to C, 
total variable costs per hectare, times f. Note that we ignore transaction costs of participating in 
the FEC (to conservatively bias upward our estimate of the percentage of subsistence covered by 
coffee income and because data on these costs are not available). 
P = p + s (2.2) 
P, the price per cwt of pergamino coffee is equal to p, the market price per cwt plus s, the 
FEC subsidy per cwt.  
Y = tn (2.3) 
 
Y, the yield per hectare in cwt pergamino is equal to t, the number of cwts of pergamino 
produced by each coffee plant, times n, the number of coffee plants per hectare.  
C = W1 + W2 + H + R + d  (2.4) 
 
C, total variable cost per hectare, is equal to W1, the cost per hectare of the first weeding, 
plus W2, the cost per hectare of the second weeding, plus H, the cost per hectare of harvesting 
coffee cherries, plus R, the cost per hectare of processing coffee cherries into pergamino, plus d, 
the cost per hectare of transporting coffee to a processing center.  
W1 = W2 = cwnL (2.5) 
 Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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W1 and W2, the cost per hectare of the first and second weeding, are equal to cw, the cost 
per plant of weeding, times n, the number of plants per hectare, times L, the percentage of total 
labor that is hired (versus provided by farm household members).  
 
{}
() {} ∞ ∈ ∀ − =
∈ ∀ =
, 5 5 1 L





L, the percentage of total labor that is hired, is zero for farms 5 hectares and smaller and 
is an increasing function of farm size for larger farms.  
H = YrcnL (2.7) 
 
H, the cost per hectare of harvesting coffee cherries, is equal to Y, the yield of pergamino 
coffee per hectare in cwt, times r, the number of cherry cans needed to harvest each cwt of 
pergamino, times cn, the labor cost per cherry can harvested, times L, the percentage of total 
labor that is hired. 
R = mwYL   (2.8) 
 
Finally, R, the cost per hectare of processing coffee cherries into pergamino, is equal to 
m, the number of person-days of labor needed to process one cwt, times w, the daily wage paid to 
laborers, times Y, the per hectare yield, times l, the percentage of total labor that is hired. Below, 
we provide the actual values for each parameter and, for convenience, repeat the definition of 
each function and parameter.  
 
C  = total variable cost per hectare, in pesos 
cn  = labor cost per cherry can harvested (20 pesos) 
cw   = labor cost per plant of weeding (0.25 pesos per plant) 
d  = cost per hectare of transporting coffee to processing center, in pesos 
f   = size of farm, in hectares (simulated for different sizes)  
H  = cost per hectare of harvesting coffee cherries, in pesos 
L  = percentage of total labor for activity that is hired 
m  = person-days labor per cwt needed for processing (1.26 days) 
n   = plants per hectare (2,850 plants)  
p   = market price per hundredweight (cwt) of pergamino coffee, in pesos 
(430 pesos) Resources for the Future  Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman 
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r   = cherry cans per cwt (18 cans) 
R  = cost per hectare of processing coffee cherries into pergamino, in pesos 
s  = FEC subsidy per cwt pergamino coffee (326 pesos) 
t   = cwt of pergamino per plant (0.0015 cwt) 
w   = daily wage paid to processing laborers (60 pesos) 
W1  = cost per hectare of first weeding, in pesos  
W2  = cost per hectare of second weeding, in pesos  
Y  = yield per hectare, in cwt pergamino coffee 
Π  = total farm profits, in pesos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 